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In the Suprenie Court of the 
State of Utah 
FEARN GRAY and LEILA GRAY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EDWARD R. STEVENS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
CASE 
NO. 8524 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The respondents do not agree with the appellants' 
Statement of Facts. 
At the time this action was commenced, plaintiffs lived 
in Payson, Utah. The home in which they lived was the 
only real property in which they owned any interest (Tr. 12-
13). On the 19th day of January, 1955, plaintiff, Fearn 
Gray~ declared a homestead in his undivided one-half inter-
est in the property (Tr. 12). The homestead was declared 
shortly before the defendant in this action levied an exe-
cution on Fearn Gray's undivided one-half interest in the 
home to satisfy a judgment which Stevens had obtained 
against Fearn Gray in an earlier action, Civil .No. 14,340. 
On the 29th day of April, 1955, the plaintiffs filed an 
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2 
action to quiet title to the plaintiff Fearn Gray's interest 
in the property in issue, which is located in Payson, Utah. 
Fearn Gray's interest was that of a joint tenant (Exhibit 
Plaintiff 2). The defendant, Edward R. Stevens, answered 
and defended against the action to quiet title. 
The plaintiffs' property was subject to certain encum-
brances. There was a mortgage to the Cbmmercial Travel-
ers Insurance Company in the amount of $5,830.96, the 
existence and validity of which is not disputed (R. 7) (Tr. 
46). The property is subject to a mortgage in the amount 
of $1,588.00 (Tr. 11) to Ri·chard and Deon Gray, the exis-
tence and validity of which note and mortgage is in dispute 
(R. 7). 
The defendant resists plaintiff's action to quiet title 
on the grounds that the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray 
is not a valid mortgage, and also on the grounds that the 
down payment made on the Payson property in the year 
1941 was made with funds which were misappropriated by 
Fearn Gray. The background of that claim is as follows: 
The defendant, Edward R. Stevens, had previously ob-
tained a judgment against the plaintiff Fearn Gray in the 
amount of $9,229.91 (Defendant's Exhibit 1) (See judgment, 
Stevens vs. Gray, Civil No. 14,240), and the plaintiffs sought 
to have the property freed from the judgment lien of Ste-
vens. On or about March 4, 1939, a partnership between 
Fearn Gray and Edward R. Stevens was dissolved (Tr. 19). 
At tbe time of the dissolution of the partnership, plaintiff 
Gray was indebted to the Bank of Spanish Fork in the 
amount of $2,000.00, the Pacific Coast Farm Land Bank, 
$1,500.00, and Utah Poultry Company in the amount of 
$1,000.00 (Tr. 24). Two years and eight months later 
Fearn Gray paid from a joint checking account which he 
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maintained with his wife, the sum of $762.00 as a down pay-
ment on the purchase price of the home now in question (Tr. 
4). He received title to the property in September of 1949 
(Tr. 5). Eight years and three months after the dissolution 
of the partnership of Stevens and Gray, Stevens filed on ac-
tion against Gray, Stevens v. Gray, 259 Pac. 2d 889, for an 
accounting of the partnership. Fourteen years and four 
months after the dissolution of the partnership, the Su-
preme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and 
entered judgment for Stevens and· against Gray. Stevens 
v. Gray, supra. In the findings in the case of Stevens v. 
Gray, nearly fifteen years after the dissolution of the part-
nership, the court found that the defendant Gray had ap-
propriated 31 head of partnership -cattle for his own use 
and benefit at a time which was uncertain. Since the last 
partnership cattle were sold on or about March 4, 1939, 
Gray was charged with that amount as of that date (Tr. 
18). 
In January of 1950, Richard Gray and Deon Gray, his 
wife, loaned to the plaintiffs the sum of $1,100.00 for the 
purpose of opening a drive-in in Payson (Tr. 35). No pay-
ment was made on the mortgage to Richard and [)eon 
Gray (Tr. 37). When the plaintiffs in this action learned 
that the trial court's action in the case of Stevens v. Gray 
had been reversed and that a judgment would be entered 
against Fearn Gray, the plaintiffs executed a ,mortgage to 
secure the $1,100.00 note for the purpose of prefering their 
son and daughter-in-law over the creditor Stevens (Tr. 17). 
On January 15, 1955, Fearn Gray filed a declaration of 
homestead in the amount of $2,750.00, $2,000.00 represent-
ing the interest of Fearn Gray as the head of a household 
and $750.00 for his spouse. 
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It is undisputed that Fearn Gray was not possessed of 
any property at the time he made the declaration of home-
stead, other than the property here in question (Tr. 12-13) 
and the other elements of a homestead are not in dispute. 
Appellant indulges in an erroneous statement throughout 
his brief, that is, that the court found that at the date of 
the dissolution of the Stevens-Gray partnership that Fearn 
Gray received money. That was not the finding of the 
court. The court found that at some time between 1936 
and March 4, 1939, Gray had appropriated 31 head of cattle 
(Tr. 18). Gray maintained at the trial of Stevens v. Gray, 
supra, that he did not appropriate the cattle and the trial 
court in _that case found with him. This is not to dispute 
the fact that we are bound by the decision of the Supreme 
C'ourt in that case. Gray testified that the $762.00 which 
he used as a down payment on the house in 1941 came from 
the sale of some cattle which he had purchased in the fall 
of 1940 (Tr. 19). 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT A JOINT 
TENANT'S INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A HO·MESTEAD INTEREST IS CORRECT. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT LEILA GRAY 
WAS A PARTNER IN THE STEVENS-GRAY PARTNER-
SHIP IS RAISED F1QR THE FIRST TIME ON THIS AP-
PEAL, AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT. 
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POINT III 
. THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THERE IS A VALID MORTGAGE TO RICHARD AND 
fDEON GRAY IS C·ORRECT A·ND IS, IN FACT, NOT DIS-
PUTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE JUDGMENT O·F THE COURT QUIETING 
TITLE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY AND 
LEILA GRAY ':DO THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST IN 
PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY'S UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE 
MORTGAGES, IS CORRECT. 
POINT V 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FEARN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIO·N 
IN HIS UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF THE 
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF SUCH EXEMPTION IS $2,750.00 IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECT. 
POINT VI 
THE . O·BJECTION RAISED IN APPEL.LANTS' 
POINT IV IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AS TO AN ALLEGED 
MISAPPROPRIATIO·N OF ANY C'A 'ITLE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT A JOINT 
TENANT'S INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A HOMESTEAD INTEREST IS CORRECI'. 
A homestead may be selected from any property of 
a husband or wife, or both, and by either, regardless of the 
estate or interest therein, the only Imitation being one of 
value. Panagopolus v. Manning, 69 P2d 614, page 620. 
Appellant argues in Point V of his brief that to permit 
a judgment debtor to declare a ·homestead in his separate 
property has the effect of doubling the amount of the ex-
emption provided for by statute. The difficulty with the 
appellant's argument is that the· statute specifically de-
clares that either spouse may declare the homestead in the 
property of both or in the property if either of them. In 
the case of Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P 2d 674, 
the wife declared the homestead in the property of her hus-
band, because her husband was the judgment debtor. The 
amount of the exemption was $2,750.00. The wife claimed 
the exemption in the husband's estate at a time when she 
was a joint owner of that very same estate. 
The fact that the wife can claim a homestead in a hus-
band's estate does not have the effect of doubling the ex-
emption of the household, because only one homestead may 
be declared. If both the husband and wife were judgment 
debtors, the effect of the homestead would not be to exempt 
property in the amount of $5,500.0, but it would exempt 
property in the amount of $2.750.00. 
This is the plain intent of the statutes and the Utah 
cases have so construed our statutes. 
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If, in the Williams v. Peterson case, supra, the wife 
could declare the homestead in the joint interest of a hus-
band, then most certainly in this case the husband may de-
clare a homestead in his own joint interest. Connsel ar-
gues that if this position is correct that joint tenants gain 
greater rights under the homestead law than would spouses 
who own property either as co-tenants or if the property 
were held solely in the name of one of the spouses. The 
complete ans\ver to appellant's Point V is the fact that the 
only homestead exemption allowed to a husband and wife 
is an exemption in the amount of $2,750.00. This exemp-
tion is intended to protect the household. It is not designed 
to protect against judgments against one spouse more than 
the other. If a judgment against either spouse or against 
both threatens the household, the exemption granted by 
the homestead may be invoked. 
Appellant engages in the fiction that a homestead ex-
emption declared by a judgment debtor out of his joint in-
terest has the effect of creating an exemption in the amount 
of $5,500.00, rather than $2,750.00. The fact is that if there 
were a judgment against both spouses the total exemption 
would be $2.750.00, and it would make no difference in what 
property the exemption was declared. 
In this case the judgment was against the husband only. 
Only the husband declared the homestead and the declara-
tion exempted his interest to the extent of $2,750.00. 
The greate weight of authority holds that there may 
be a homestead right in property held jointly or in common. 
40 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 525, Thompson on Home-
stead and Exemption, page 156, 89 A.L.R., page 540. Mar-
vin and Company v. Piazza, 276 P 680, COle et al v. Coons, 
167 P2d 295. 
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PO,INT II 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT LEILA GRAY 
WAS A PARTNER IN THE STEVENS-GRAY PARTNER-
SHIP IS RAISED ~OR THE FIRST TIME ON THIS AP-
PEAL, AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT. 
The contention that Leila Gray was a partner in the 
partnership of Gray and Stevens is raised for the first time 
on this appeal. No such claim was made in the district 
court. 
Finding Number 2 in Civil Number 14,340, defendants 
Exhibit 1, supra, found that Stevens and Gray were the 
partners. 
Counsel, a page 13 of his brief, sets forth the follow-
ing statement of law: 
"A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdic-
tion of the parties and subject matter is conclusive and 
undisputable evidence as to all rights, questions, or 
facts put in issue in the suit and actually adjudicated 
thereon where the same comes again into controversy 
between the same parties or their privies, even though 
according to the decision on the questions, the subse-
quent proceedings are on a different cause of action, 
since the law abhors a multiplicity of suits." 50 CJS, 
page 168, sec. 711. 
In view of the finding in the Stevens vs. Gray lawsuit 
that there was a partnership and that Mr. Stevens and Mr. 
Gray were the partners, the court should not seriously re-
gard appellant's argument that Mrs. Gray was also a part-
ner. The partners were detennined in the earlier case. 
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That decree based upon Finding Number 2 in Civil 14,340 
is conclusive on the court in this case. 
POiNT III 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THJERE IS A VALID MORTGAGE TO RICHARD AND 
DEON GRAY IS CORRECT AND IS, IN FACT, NOT DIS-
PUTED BY THE EVIDEN,CE. 
The claim of the defendant that this mortgage is not 
a valid mortgage is totally without merit. The plaintiffs 
admit that the mortgage given to Richard and Deon Gray 
was given to prefer Richard and Dean Gray over Edward 
R. Stevens. This plaintiffs had a right to do. UCA 1953, 
6-1-20. · Such a preference may be given in the exerci~ of 
a lawful right, and will not affect the conveyance. Nor is 
it necessarily indicative of fraud that the preferred credi-
tors are relatives of the assignors. (Pettit v. Parsons, 9 Utah 
223, 33 Pac. 1038). Fraud will not be presumed. It must 
be alleged, and the party alleging it must prove it by com-
petent evidence. Pettit v. Parsons, supra. 
Fraud must be specially pleaded. Utah URPC, Rule 
9(b). An examination of plaintiffs' answer and of their 
additional answer wiH disclose that the answer alleges that 
the mortgage was executed for the purpose of defeating the 
defendant's judgment in the Stevens v. Gray case. The 
answer of the defendant, however, merely alleges that ther 
is nothing due or owing on the mortgage. There is no ref-
erence to the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray in the 
additional answer. 
The mortgage of Richard and Deon Gray in the sum 
of $1588.00 (Tr. 11) secured a note which was given in Feb-
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ruary 1, 1950. The consideration given for said note was the 
sum of $1,100.00. Five Hundred dollars ($500.00) was 
drawn out of the Zion's Savings and Trust, Three Hundred 
dollars ($300.00) from the Commercial Bank of Utah, and 
the sum of Three Hundred dollars ($300.00) from cash that 
Richard and Deon Gray had in their home (R. 35). This 
money was used by the plaintiffs to open a drive-in at Pay-
son, Utah. ·The note which was introduced into evidence 
(P. Exhibit No. 3) was identified by Mr. Gray (Tr. 10) as 
the note given in exchange for the money borrowed. Rich-
ard Gray testified that he received the note in exchange for 
the said $1,100.00 (Tr. 35). 
The defendant in no way refuted plaintiffs' claim that 
there was money due and owing to the son and daughter-in-
law of the plaintiff. Defendant's only evidence in that re-
gard is the bald statement that additional evidence should 
have been presented to substantiate the note. Under the 
Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act adopted by the State 
of Utah, and which is now the law of the State, considera-
tion is presumed. U.C.A., 1953 Title 44-1-25, reads as fol-
lows: "Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable 
instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for 
a valuable consideration, and every person whose signa-
ture appears thereon, to have become a party thereto for 
value.'' 
Under the above law there is a presumption that the 
note and mortgage given to Reichard and Deon Gray when 
introduced into evidence and properly identified are valid. 
The burden then falls upon the defendant to prove some in-
firmity. Hudson vs. Moon, 130 Pacif.ic 774. 
The defendant did not introduce any evidence of his 
own or by cross examination to prove that the said note and 
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mortgage \Vere not a valid and existing debt. ·There is not 
one scintilla of evidence to show that this was a so-called 
device to eliminate the judgment of the defendant. Plain-
tiffs admit that the mortgage given to his son was to pre-
fer him and was made in good faith ·and to secure the ad-
vancement made three years before. This in itself does 
not make the transaction fraudulent, 6-1-20 Utah Code An-
notated, 4 Am. Juris. 397. The plaintiff, Fearn Gray, had 
been in a bitter lawsuit with the defendant, and realizing 
that a judgment was about to be placed of record, he gave 
his son and daughter-in-law a mortgage to secure their 
loan. The plaintiffs had no other property. 
In the absence of any pleading alleging fraud and in 
the absence of any evidence which would support a conten-
tion of fraud, the trial court was emminently justified in 
finding that the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray was 
. a valid mortgage and a lien on the property. 
POINT IV 
THE JUDGMENT O·F THE COURT QUIETING 
TITLE IN FAVO~R OF PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY AND 
LEILA GRAY TO THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST IN 
PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY'S UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF 
INTEREST IN THE PROPE.RTY SUBJECT TO THE 
MORTGAGES, IS CORRECT. 
Respondents claim that the homestead interest is in-
valid because it was obtained with misappropriated funds. 
This claim relates to the down payment on the home in the 
amount of $762.00 which was paid in 1941. 
Respondents do not dispute the authorities listed on 
page 14 of appellants' brief to the effect that a homestead 
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which has been acquired with misappropriated money can-
not be defended as against the person whose money has 
been misappropriated and applied on the payment of the 
claimed homestead. 
This claim of the appellant's has been made in the ap-
pellant's "Additional Answer" which was filed at the date 
of this trial. 
In considering this question, it should be born in mind 
that this claim was an affirmative defense. The burden 
of proof on that issue was on the defendant. (Bancroft 
Code Pleading, page 977). 
Appellant repeatedly asserts that Gray was possessed 
of some $3,400.00 at the time of the dissolution of the Ste-
vens-Gray partnership. This is not correct. Gray was 
charged with having 31 head of cattle for which he had 
not accounted, and the court charged him with the value 
of those cattle. 
The record does not show that Fearn Gray had any 
money at the dissolution of the partnership. The testimony 
was that he did not have any money, and that he was heav-
ily in debt. 
In order to impress the homestead interest of Fearn 
Gray with a trust, it is necessary to establish that the home-
stead was acquired with misappropriated funds. 
"The right of the owner of misappropriated prop-
erty to follow it and thereby acquire priority over other 
creditors of the wrong-does is no longer available if 
the property has been wholly dissipated." Scott on 
Trusts, 1939, Vol. 3, page 2500. 
"As has been stated, the mere fact that claimant's 
property has been mingled with that of the wrong-doer 
in one indistinguishable mass does not preclude him 
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from having a preference over the creditor's of the 
wrong-doer. Thus, where the claimant's property is 
deposited in a bank with money of the wrong-doer,. the 
claimant is entitled to reach the deposit. Where, how-
ever, the whole of the deposit is withdrawn, the money 
cannot be traced, the claimant is not entitled to pri-
ority over other creditors." Scott on Trusts, 1939, Vol. 
3 page 2505. 
Appellant, at page 15 of his brief, cites 3 Pomeroy 
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition, pages 3297,2401, and we 
quote: 
"A constructive trust arises whenever another's 
property has been wrongfully appropriated and con-
verted into a different form. Equity impresses a con-
structive trust upon the new form or species of property 
(where property is wrongfully taken) not only while 
it is in the hands of the original wrong-does, but as long 
as it can be followed and identified in whosoever's 
hands it may come, except into those of a bona fide 
purchaser for value and without notice, and the court 
will enforce the constructive trust for the benefit of the 
beneficial owner or original cestui que trust who has 
thus been defrauded." 
This authority and the authorities which respondents 
have been able to find are in agreement that misappropri-
ated property may be impressed with a trus.t as long as it 
can be followed and identified. 
An examination of the opinion in Stevens v. Gray, 
supra, will reveal that the amount of money with which 
Fearn Gray was charged was arrived at by a mathematical 
computation. There was no effort in that case to identify 
any proceeds of the partnership assets. 
There being no specific property or funds to follow, the 
result is that Stevens becomes a general creditor, (Citation 
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54 Am. Jur. P. 192. See also Ferchen v. Arndt, 37 P. 161, 
State v. Foster, 38 P. 926), and as a general creditor a trust 
would not be impressed upon the homestead interest of 
Fearn Gray. 
Plaintiffs would like to point out to the Court that the 
claimed misappropriation applies to the $762.00 down pay-
ment out of a purchase price of $3,600.00, and only to the 
down payment (Tr. 4). 
POINT V 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FEARN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIO·N 
IN HIS UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF THE 
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF SUCH EXEMPTION IS $2,750.00 IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECf. 
The trial court found that the reasonable value of the 
home in Payson, Utah, belonging to Fearn and Leila Gray 
to be $12,000.00. The following is a computation showing 
th~ value of the interest of Fearn Gray: 
VALUE OF HOME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12,000.00 
Less: 
Commercial Travelers 
Insurance Mortgage . . . . . . . $5,788.95 
Richard and Deon 
Gray's Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . 1,588.02 
Total Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . . $7,376.97 
V1alue of Home Less Mortgages .... 
Less Leila Gray's One-Half Interest 
FE.ARN GRAY'S INTEREST ..... 
7,376.97 
$4,623.03 
2,311.51 
$2,311.51 
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Under the Statutes of Utah, 28-1-1, UCA, 1853, the head 
of the family is allowed an exemption of $2,000.00, and the 
further sum of $750.00 for his spouse, making a total sum 
exempt in the case at hand of $2,750.00 exemption. The 
value of Fearn Gray's interest being the sum of $2.,311.51, 
is less than that which he is allowed as the head of the fam-
ily and his spouse under the homestead laws of Utah. Hence, 
he has no interest in the property in question upon which 
the defendant's lien could attach. 
The trial court, in finding that the reasonable market 
value of the property in question was $12,000.00, did not 
err. Of the four real estate experts called to testify, three 
put the value at $12,000.00 or less (Tr. 39) (Tr. 43) (Tr. 
49) (Tr. 53). 
Mrs. Gray's undivided one-half interest was not re-
ceived as a gift from her husband; she paid a consideration 
for it. Mrs. Gray's testimony that she had invested money 
in her husband's business (Tr. 28) and that she had operated 
a Drive-Inn at Payson, Utah, and had made payments upon 
the Commercial Travelers Mortgage was undisputed. The 
evidence shows that she contributed toward the purchase 
of the home and toward the payments on the mortgage. 
The equity of the plaintiffs after the deduction of the 
two mortgages is $4,623.03. One-half of that is rightfully 
the property of Mrs. Gray as a joint tenant, and is not sub-
ject to defendant's judgment lien. 
POINT VI 
THE OBJECTIO~N RAISED IN APPELLANTS' 
POINT IV IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AS TO AN ALLEGE·D 
MISAPPROPRIATIO·N OF ANY CATTLE. 
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There were no Issues in this case respecting the part-
nership accounting which was the subject matter of the 
Stevens-Gray suit. The cattle to which appellant refers 
in p·oint IV were part of the subject. matter of the Stevens-
Gray lawsuit. They were the subject of a particular finding 
by the court in the earlier case. Respondent is bound by 
the decree in the earlier lawsuit as is the appellant. A find-
i~ng by the court on that issue would have been completely 
useless. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVE McMULLIN, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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